## ELEXON

## **Technical Assurance Scope of Work**

| Current PAOP   | 2022/2023             | Purpose of paper  | Information              | Date published | May 2022   |
|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------|--|
| Document Owner | TAPAP Technique Owner | Classification    | Public                   | Most recent RO | P PAB255/07  |
| Synopsis       | • •                   | ance of Performar | nce Assurance Parties (1 | •              | able summarises all checks included erformance Assurance Operating |

## **Current Scope**

| PAOP    | Risk | or Risk Event   | Approved                | Reason for<br>check  | Participants                                 | Description   |
|---------|------|---|-------------------------|--|--|---|
| 2022/23 | R003 | Metering Equipment installation, programming, maintenance and Commissioning | ROP Apr 22<br>PAB255/07 | Focus area in<br>ROP<br>Post-COVID-<br>19 pandemic<br>market<br>recovery | Licenced Distribution System Operator (LDSO) | 'Supplier Volume Allocation (SVA) Metering Equipment is installed, programmed or maintained incorrectly including where Commissioning is performed incorrectly or not at all'  Compare the results of Technical Assurance of Metering (TAM) and BSC Audit with regards to Commissioning performance and deploy the TAPAP technique to investigate areas of concern.   |
| 2022/23 | R005 | SVA Fault resolution  | ROP Apr 22<br>PAB255/07 | Focus area in<br>ROP<br>Post-COVID-<br>19 pandemic<br>market<br>recovery | Data Collector<br>(DC)                       | 'A fault with SVA Metering Equipment is not resolved, such that Metered Data is recorded incorrectly or cannot be retrieved'  Some faults can been fixed remotely but those that require a site visit will not be able to be fixed as quickly as expected due to site access issues and backlogs following the pandemic. Desktop assessment / review to check how DC Metering fault flags correlate to reported Meter faults using a Request for Information (RFI), to ensure that fault flags are being used correctly. TAPAP to be considered following desktop assessment of DC fault flags. |
| 2022/23 | R005 | SVA Fault resolution  | ROP Apr 22<br>PAB255/07 | Focus area in<br>ROP<br>Processes<br>associated with<br>SoLR events      | DC   | When a Supplier of Last Resort (SoLR) event occurs, all investigations would be closed and would need to be re-diagnosed by the new Agent and the fault would not be corrected in a timely manner. Engage with biggest SoLRs to understand resource constraints with regards to fault resolution. Possible TAPAP to be combined with the same identified risk for Post-COVID-19 pandemic market recovery.   |

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## Previous year's scope

| PAOP    | Risk o | r Risk Event          | Approved   | Reason for check  | Participants  | Description   | Completed  |
|---------|--------|-----------------------|--|---|---|---|--|
| 2021/22 | N/A    | N/A                   | ROP Mar 21<br>PAB242/05<br>Risk<br>Management<br>Determination<br>(RMD)<br>Aug 21<br>PAB247/05 | Performance<br>Assurance<br>Framework<br>(PAF) Review<br>recommendation | SVA Suppliers   | At the June 2020 PAB Meeting, the PAF Review provided recommendations to the TAPAP technique (PAB233/11 - 'PAF Technique review recommendations - TAPAP'), including a TAPAP Audit of the actions taken by Suppliers regarding appointed Supplier Agents' BSC Audit Issues. This TAPAP will: Provide assurance of Suppliers' management of their individual Supplier Hub; and Assess the appropriateness and efficacy of actions taken by Suppliers in order to address BSC Audit Issues raised against their appointed Supplier Agents.  | Yes<br>Reported<br>April 22<br>PAB255/TBC                                |
| 2020/21 | R011   | Unmetered<br>Supplies | ROP Jan 19<br>PAB216/09<br>RMD Dec 10<br>PAB227/08   | Focus Risk in<br>ROP  | Unmetered<br>Supplies<br>System<br>Operator<br>(UMSO) | 'Unmetered Supplies volumes are calculated incorrectly or not at all'  Impact rationale: Impact is driven by assessment of volumes associated with UMS related Consumption Component Class (CCC) IDs from the Data Transfer Network (DTN) Flows.  Target Impact Rationale: Exploratory actions will allow us to reassess risk impact more accurately and encourage reduction in volatility and a reduction in impact.  Risk factor: Lack of clarity for UMSO process  | Yes<br>Reported<br>Aug 21<br>PAB247/04                                   |
| 2019/20 | R005   | SVA Fault resolution  | ROP Jan 19<br>PAB216/09  | Focus Risk in<br>ROP  | All SVA   | 'A fault with SVA Metering Equipment is not resolved, such that Metered Data is recorded incorrectly or cannot be retrieved'  Impact rationale: Impact is driven by assessment of all identified or suspected faults that should result in a Metering System investigation from the DTN Data Flows and HM14 PARMs.  Target Impact Rationale: There is an open Issue Group reviewing Fault Management, Elexon expect improvements to the process to result from the completion of the issue group, with a small reduction in impact  Risk factor: Performance Management Insight | No due to Issue 73: Review of fault management and resolution timescales |
| 2019/20 | R007   | SVA Metered data      | ROP Jan 19<br>PAB216/09  | Focus Risk in<br>ROP  | SVA<br>Suppliers                                      | 'SVA Metered data is not retrieved, such that the proportion of estimated data being used in Settlement contributes to performance standards not being met'.  Impact rationale: Driven by the assessment of Annual Consumption by Measurement Class (MC) and Profile Class (PC). The Industry performance and the failure to retrieve Metered Data and the costs associated   | Yes<br>Reported<br>Feb 20<br>PAB229/08                                   |

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| PAOP      | Risk or Risk Event |                                   | Approved   | Reason for check                           | Participants  | Description  | Completed   |
|-----------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|---|--|---|
|           |                    |                                   |  |  |   | Target Impact Rationale: Further assessment of root causes and a refreshed approach to mitigation should enable a reduction in Impact and a reduction in volatility.  Risk factor: Poor Performance Insight  |   |
| 2019/20   | R011               | Unmetered<br>Supplies             | ROP Jan 19<br>PAB216/09<br>RMD Dec 10<br>PAB227/08 | Focus Risk in<br>ROP                       | UMSO  | 'Unmetered Supplies volumes are calculated incorrectly or not at all'  Impact rationale: Impact is driven by assessment of volumes associated with UMS related Consumption Component Class (CCC) IDs from the DTN Data Flows.  Target Impact Rationale: Exploratory actions will allow us to reassess risk impact more accurately and encourage reduction in volatility and a reduction in impact.  Risk factor: Lack of clarity for UMSO process  | Postponed to<br>2020/21<br>PAOP<br>because of<br>COVID 19   |
| 2019/20   | R018               | Revenue<br>Protection             | ROP Jan 19<br>PAB216/09                            | Focus Risk in<br>ROP                       | SVA Suppliers   | 'Revenue Protection processes are not managed sufficiently, such that unrecorded energy volumes are excluded from Settlement'  Impact rationale: Impact is driven by assessment of identified energy theft not being Settled from OFGEM reporting.  Target Impact Rationale: Volatility within this Risk calculation can be improved via improved data sources and analysis. We anticipate a minor reduction in impact.  Risk factor: Lack of data to understand Risk  | No<br>Not enough<br>evidence to<br>support<br>where a<br>check should<br>be directed<br>at this stage |
| 2019/20   | R023               | CVA Fault resolution              | ROP Jan 19<br>PAB216/09                            | Focus Risk in<br>ROP                       | Central Volume<br>Allocation<br>(CVA)<br>BSC Meter<br>Operator Agent<br>(MOA) | 'A fault with CVA Metering Equipment is not resolved, such that Metered Data is recorded incorrectly or cannot be retrieved'  Impact rationale: Impact is driven by assessment of changes made to CVA Metering equipment from the fault log of the Central Data Collection Agent (CDCA). ELEXON note comparable volume of faults over previous years.  Target Impact Rationale: Improved focus against this risk, and a wider distribution of FR Reporting should promote control of this risk, reducing impact.  Risk factor: Performance Management. | No<br>Not enough<br>evidence to<br>support<br>where a<br>check should<br>be directed<br>at this stage |
| 2019/2020 | R006<br>R012       | Late and<br>Missing Smart<br>MTDs | RMD Aug 18<br>PAB211/07                            | Elexon's Smart<br>MTDs Report<br>PAB208/04 |   | Smart MTDs  R006 On a change of agent, Meter Technical Details are not transferred or processed correctly or at all, such that parties do not use the latest Meter Technical Details R012 SVA Metering System technical details are created incorrectly  | Reported<br>Feb 19<br>PAB217/08   |

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| PAOP      | Risk or            | Risk or Risk Event Approved    |  | Reason for check                  | Participants                           | Description  | Completed                        |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|
|           |                    |                                |  |                                   |  | The Interim Smart Risk Register denotes SMSR0006 as the risk Meter Technical Details are inaccurate or missing as a result of MOA processes resulting in estimated or erroneous data entering Settlement. The performance of eight MOAs in respect of sending late MTDs was highlighted as a concern through ELEXON's Smart MTDs Report at its May 2018 PAB meeting PAB208/04.   |                                  |
| 2018/2019 | SR0024<br>SR0025   | Incorrect MTDs                 | ROP Oct 17<br>PAB201/04<br>RMD Jun 17<br>PAB197/14 | Top Settlement<br>Risks in ROP    | HH/NHH<br>Supplier<br>MOA              | MTDs Risks that Meter Operator Agents (MOAs) do not provide MTDs to the correct Data Collector (DC) resulting in Meter readings not being collected. SR0024 relates to Non-Half Hourly (NHH) operations and agents and SR0025 to Half Hourly (HH).  ELEXON noted that there were limitations in the current assessment process against these Risks through PARMS data. PARMS does not give a credible view of risk. The view of compliance that it gives is often unclear, inaccurate, incomplete or inconsistent.  Check will determine the PAPs which are contributing to the root causes of SR0024 and SR0025 and to determine whether EFR is required.   | Reported<br>May 18<br>PAB208/05  |
| 2016/17   | Mod<br><u>P272</u> | Automatic Meter<br>Read Meters | May 2016<br>PAB184/04                              | Modification implementation check | ННМОА                                  | Automatic Meter Read Meters Issue 46: Non Half Hourly Interoperability  Since the Authority's approval of Modification P272 ELEXON has received a number of questions of interoperability of the AMR Meters upon Change of Measurement Class (CoMC) events. These concerns had been initially raised during the workgroup meeting Issue 46: Non Half Hourly Interoperability. In January 2016, the Performance Assurance Board (PAB) asked ELEXON to look into the potential impacts of SMETS 1 Meters ahead of the Data Communication Company (DCC) go live. The PAB was concerned that interoperability issues similar to those for AMR Meters could potentially affect SMETS 1 Meter performance. | Reported<br>Sept 16<br>PAB188/09 |
| 2016/17   | Mod<br>P283        | Meter<br>Commissioning         | Feb 16<br>PAB181/12                                | Modification implementation check | NHH<br>MOA<br>LDSO<br>IDNO<br>Supplier | P283 Commissioning Process Implementation extension to cover additional Parties.   | Reported<br>Jul 16<br>PAB186/13  |
| 2015/16   | Mod<br>P283        | Meter<br>Commissioning         | Apr 15<br>PAB171/05                                | Modification implementation check | NHH<br>MOA<br>LDSO<br>IDNO<br>Supplier | P283, "Reinforcing the Commissioning of Metering Equipment Processes"  After the results of the 2014/15 P283 TAPAP check, the PAB requested that we perform another check on the P283 Commissioning processes.   | Reported<br>Dec 15<br>PAB179/06  |
| 2014/15   | Mod<br>P283        | Meter<br>Commissioning         | ROP approved by                                    | Modification implementation check | NHH<br>MOA<br>LDSO                     | P283, "Reinforcing the Commissioning of Metering Equipment Processes", was implemented on 6 November 2014. The Modification placed Commissioning obligations on the Metering Equipment owner, in effect shifting responsibility for  | Reported<br>Apr 15<br>PAB171/05  |

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| PAOP    | Risk o   | r Risk Event  | Approved                                     | Reason for check      | Participants                          | Description   | Completed          |
|---------|--|---|--|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------|
|         |  |   | the PAB in<br>Oct 2013                       |                       | IDNO<br>Supplier                      | the Commissioning of Measurement Transformers from the Meter Operator Agent (MOA) to the Licenced Distribution System Operator (LDSO), Independent Distribution Network Operator (IDNO) or Transmission Company where applicable. It also placed an obligation on the MOA to inform the Registrant (the Supplier) of the Commissioning status of each Metering System. The intention of the TAPAP check was to assess how the new obligations have been adopted by Suppliers, System Operators (LDSOs & IDNOs) and Half Hourly MOAs, and to identify any process breakdowns at an early stage so that we can work to rectify these.   |                    |
| 2012/13 |  | SVA Fault<br>Investigation  | ROP<br>approved by<br>the PAB in<br>Oct 2011 | Process review        | MOA<br>DC<br>LDSO Suppliers           | Fault Investigation Process  The Meter Technical Details process review (presented to the PAB in January 2012 (PAB132/06)) concluded that the Fault Investigation process as set out in BSCP514 is weak and required further evaluation.  | Reported<br>May 13 |
| 2011/12 | NA   | Trading<br>Disputes   | ROP<br>approved by<br>the PAB in<br>Oct 2010 | Process review        | HH & NHH<br>Suppliers HH &<br>NHH DCs | Investigating the Trading Disputes Process  The Trading Dispute Committee instigated a review of the Trading Disputes processes in 2009, which resulted in 12 recommendations, one of which was Modification Proposal P258. Modification P258 sought to include Supplier Agents (in particular DCs) in the Trading Disputes process by obligating them to notify ELEXON of significant errors that may have an impact on Settlement. This was rejected by The Panel. It was recommended that we use the TAPAP technique to investigate the issues the Modification sought to address. Such a check would assess whether there was an underlying issue and may give rise to a better solution at a later date.   | Reported<br>May 12 |
| 2010/11 | SR0022<br>SR0112<br>SR0116<br>SR0113<br>SR0037 | Metering<br>Equipment<br>installation,<br>programming,<br>maintenance<br>and<br>Commissioning | ROP<br>approved by<br>the PAB in<br>Oct 2009 | Focus Risks in<br>ROP | LDSO<br>HHMOA                         | Maintaining and Managing Metering System Records  SR0022: The risk that HHDCs do not use the correct Meter Technical Details resulting in Meter readings being misinterpreted or not collected.  SR0112: The risk that HHDCs use data from faulty Metering Systems resulting in incorrect data being entered into Settlement.  SR0116: The risk that Import/Export Metering Systems are incorrectly installed/configured resulting in inaccurate data entering Settlement.  SR0113: The risk that the LDSO-owned Settlement Metering Equipment is not maintained, resulting in incorrect data entering Settlement.  SR0037: The risk that LDSOs connect and energise Supplies before MOAs have installed, commissioned and energised a Metering System.  Meter System record these records are important under the BSC because they provide assurance that the Metering Equipment is accurate and will record energy volumes as such. Participants must store and retrieve existing and new records in a way that supports their Code obligations. There were a number of indicators that led the PAB to approve a TA check on Metering System records. | Reported<br>Apr 11 |

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| PAOP                       | Risk o   | Risk Event  | Approved                                     | Reason for check      | Participants                  | Description  | Completed                 |
|----------------------------|--|---|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| 2010/11                    | PARMS<br>serials<br>SP05<br>and<br>SP06                  | Retrospective<br>appointment of<br>agents and<br>Sending the<br>notification of<br>change to<br>parties data<br>flow(D0148) | ROP<br>approved by<br>the PAB in<br>Oct 2009 | Focus Risks in<br>ROP | NHH Suppliers<br>HH Suppliers | Supplier Appointments and Associated notifications  These checks were designed to look at what is happening in the industry in terms of the processes supporting notifications going to Supplier Agents, from Suppliers. In particular this focussed on the Change of Supplier and Change of Agent processes, because this is where the majority of activity is in the market at present (compared to other processes in the BSC e.g. Change of Licensed Distribution System Operator and Coincident Change of Supplier and Measurement Class from a Non-Half Hourly to a Half Hourly SVA Metering System). We reviewed the processes against the BSC. The BSC is specific in its obligations for this area, and we wanted these checks to provide assurance they are working or to highlight areas of weakness so that improvements might be made.  | Reported<br>Apr 10        |
| 2010/11                    | -  | Revenue<br>Protection   | ROP<br>approved by<br>the PAB in<br>Oct 2009 | Focus Risks in<br>ROP | NHH Suppliers<br>NHHDC        | Processing Revenue Protection Reads  These checks were designed to look at what is happening in industry in terms of the processes supporting revenue protection investigations. We reviewed those processes against the BSC. The BSC has minimal obligations specific to revenue protection so we also wanted to use these checks to explore how the processes fit to the BSC and highlight any issues and make recommendations as appropriate (changes to the BSC and / or CSDs, we may also need to feed our findings into other code governors).   | Reported<br>Apr 10        |
| Aug 2008<br>to<br>Mar 2010 | SR0022<br>SR0040<br>SR0027<br>SR0028<br>SR0174<br>SR0175 | Incorrect MTDs<br>Meter change<br>not updated   | Aug 08<br>PAB90/05                           | Focus Risks in<br>ROP | NHH and HH<br>MOA             | Meter Technical Details  SR0022 & SR0040: The risk that NHH & HHMOAs do not provide correct Meter Technical Details to the NHH & HHDCs resulting in Meter readings being misinterpreted or not collected.  SR0027 & SR0028: The risk that NHH & HHMOAs make changes to the Metering System and do not inform the NHH &HHDCs resulting in Meter readings being misinterpreted or not collected.  SR0174 & SR0175: The risk that NHH & HHMOAs do not provide correct Meter Technical Details to the LDSOs resulting in the LDSOs not receiving data of sufficient accuracy to enable the calculation of LLFs correctly.  The checks looked at working instructions and a sample of Metering System IDs (MSIDs) to assess compliance against the BSC and CSDs. These checks were designed to highlight issues, Recommend improvements and provide assistance to the industry by looking at the opportunities to improve Meter Operation processes and associated documentation. | Yes<br>Reported<br>Mar 09 |

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